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FAILING STUDENTS OPTIMALLY
Arthur J. Caplan

ABSTRACT

This paper estimates the deadweight loss associated with not failing an optimal
number of students. We find that this loss ranges between $3,200 and $4,600 per student
over the student's four-year undergraduate career. One possible ramification of adopting
a more stringent student-failure policy (to recoup the deadweight loss) is investigated.
We find that an institution can promote greater effort on the part of both students and
faculty by encouraging faculty to fail more students.
JEL Classification: D21, D61, 120
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1. Introduction

The on-going debate over grade inflation is focused on whether instructors have been too
generous in awarding their students A and B grades over the past 25 years and thereby
inflating cumulative grade point averages. On one side of the debate, Rojstaczer (2004),
Johnson (2003), Rosovsky and Hartley (2002) and Levine (1998) provide evidence of
significant grade inflation occurring at virtually every public and private institution
nationwide. On the other hand, Adelman, et al. (2003) argue that only minor changes in
grade distributions have occurred. Kohn (2004) claims that the rising tide of grades does
not in itself prove that grade inflation exists-it must be proven that higher grades are
undeserved. This debate is important from an economic standpoint because, as
Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2003) point out, years of grade inflation make grades
permanently less informative, leading to potential labor-market distortions. Grade
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inflation also presents a prisoner's dilemma for institutions that might otherwise consider
implementing a grade-deflation policy. Their students might be disadvantaged in the
labor market relative to students from other institutions.
The debate, important as it is, has left unanswered an enticing question. Rather
than asking whether we are awarding students too many A's and B' s, the better question
might be, are we awarding enough F's? The case in favor of more F's is compelling.
Failing more students may increase an institution's profitability. 1 Profits would increase,
for instance, if the tuition revenue obtained from the next student who retakes a failed
course exceeds the sum of (i) the expected tuition lost if the student instead decides to
drop out of the institution rather than retake the course, and (ii) any opportunity costs
associated with the loss of excess institutional capacity (e.g., potential bottlenecks in
course enrollments or new-student admissions). Thus, a get-tough policy may make
economic sense regardless of whether the institution is experiencing grade inflation. To
the extent that it desires to maximize profit, the institution would be rational to seek an
optimal student failure rate. 2,3 Furthermore, common knowledge about the institution's

I Failing more students might also exacerbate the grade inflation problem for institutions that not
only replace an F grade with the new grade once the student retakes the course, but also recalculates the
student's cumulative grade point average without the earlier F grade included.
2 This fIrm-orientated perspective of course abstracts from the more market-orientated prisonersdilemma problem alluded to earlier.
3 In cases where its grading standard-reflected here as optimally choosing the number of courses
students will typical fail-is positively correlated with its prestige, a prestige-maximizing institution with
current grading standards (i.e., number of student failures) beneath its optimal level will necessarily move
toward the prestige optimum by choosing instead to maximize profIts as long as current grading standards
are similarly beneath the profIt optimum. Given the nationwide trends in state funding of public
institutions, profIt-maximizing behavior at prestige-minded institutions is also more likely to become the
rule over time rather than the exception (Lohmann, 2004; Riggs, 2004; Ehrenberg, 2000; Steinberg, 2000;
and Lenth, 1993).
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new "get-tough" student-failure policy may induce students and professors to devote
more effort to their studies and course preparations, respectively.4,5
This paper presents a simple theoretical framework within which an optimal
decision rule is derived for the number of failed courses per student (Section 2) and
provides empirical estimates of (i) the optimal number of failed courses per student and
(ii) the corresponding deadweight loss (Section 3). We find that the optimal number of
failed courses per student is approximately six. Given that the typical student currently
fails slightly less than one course during his four-year career, this translates into a
deadweight loss of between $3,200 and $4,600 per student. Section 4 presents the
heuristics of how a get-tough student-failure policy might induce both students and
professors to devote more effort toward the learning experience and thereby move from a
low-effort/low-effort to a high-effortlhigh-effort state of the world. Section 5 concludes.

2. The Theory of Failing Students Optimally
Consider a profit-maximizing academic institution that chooses the number of courses
typical students of class-standing i majoring in a discipline in each of j colleges will fail
during the period of their degree programs, Fijt. 6 The institution's problem may be
written as,

4 Imagine the laughs an institution's public relations office could have while designing a
marketing campaign for the new get-tough policy. A few slogans that quickly (and perhaps imprudently)
come to mind are "F 'ern," "F You," and "Just say no to grade inflation."

5 Professors may have greater incentive to invest more effort in their courses if they are no longer
encouraged to withhold F's for students who they might otherwise not have passed. Failing grades might
be withheld in order to (1) avoid having to deal with the students for a second time (Knight Ridder Tribune
Business News, 2003), (2) maintain future enrollments (Dobbs, 2004), or (3) maintain good student
evaluations (Arnold, 2004; Johnson, 2003; Cohen, 2003; O'Dell, 2003; Walzer, 2003; Rosovsky and
Hartley, 2002; and Becker and Watts, 1999). Of course, the incentive to withhold failing grades is
dependent upon the commensurate policies adopted by the institution to alleviate these three concerns.
6 In- versus out-of-state students, domestic versus foreign students, and specific major are three
other possible student identifiers that might be important to administrators. However, it is unlikely that
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subject to

(t~jtJ ~ 0, i = 1, ... ,1, j = 1, ... ,J

St = S- tujC j
j=l
i=l

(1)

where Tt is the per-course tuition rate (assumed constant across student types and
t+Tj

colleges) in period t; Ti~D

=

f TtDe-Pt is the discounted cumulative tuition revenue lost for

student type i (assumed constant across colleges) from period t onward (TtDis tuition
revenue lost during period t and Ti is the finite number of periods during which tuition
revenue is lost); Pijt (~jt) is student i's (in college j) probability of dropping out of the

°

university (Pi;t > 0, Pi;t ~ V i, j, and t); p >

°

is a discount rate; St 2: 0, S >

°,

and Cj are,

respectively, current excess institutional capacity, initial excess institutional capacity, and
lost excess capacity at college j's level (C~ > 0, C; ~

°

V j); ~ >

°
°

excess institutional capacity (measured in implicit revenue); and

is the per-unit value of

< Uj < 1 is a college-

J

level capacity weighting factor,

L u j = 1.7
j=l

The institution's problem is therefore to choose (i) a vector of the number of
failed courses and (ii) excess institutional capacity that maximize the difference between
these types of identifiers would proffer permissible distinctions upon which to base a student-failure policy
(e.g., it seems unrealistic to assume that an administration could specify distinct optimal failure rates for inversus out-of-state students, domestic versus foreign students, or electrical-engineering versus
communications majors as they might for freshmen versus seniors and majors in the college of engineering
versus the college of humanities, arts, and the social sciences).
7 Note that p > 0 along with the fact that the profit function is continuous, nonnegative (by the
assumption of nonnegative profits in the long-run), and bounded (by the second-partial condition on q)
ensures that the integral in the objective function will converge (Chiang, 1992).
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the discounted stream of aggregate revenue (based on the sum of additional tuition
receipts from students choosing to retake failed courses and the implicit value of excess
institutional capacity) and the discounted stream of expected costs (based on expected
cumulative future tuition receipts foregone as students choose to dropout rather than
retake additional failed courses), subject to an excess institutional-capacity constraint.
The rate at which excess capacity diminishes over time is in tum governed by each
college's weighting factor (i.e., the rate at which the loss of a unit of excess capacity at
the college's level impacts the university's overall excess institutional capacity) and the
degree to which the number of failed courses incurred by the typical student impacts the
respective colleges' excess capacity levels.
For example, ifnew student enrollment in a critical number of colleges is
particularly sensitive to the aggregate number of courses failed by students i

=

1, ... ,1 due

to potential c1assroom- or faculty-availability constraints (e.g., C~ is relatively large at the
given Fij for a critical number of colleges) and these colleges utilize a relatively large
share of the institution's overall capacity (i.e.,aj for these colleges is also relatively
large), then, all else equal, courses failed by typical students in those colleges will have a
relatively large negative impact on the institution's overall excess capacity. As shown
below, this negative effect on institutional excess capacity in tum increases the
incremental cost associated with an additional failed course, which ultimately works to
reduce the optimal number of courses failed by student i in college}, V i and}.
Assuming an interior solution for number of failed courses (i.e.,~; > 0 V i and}),
the necessary conditions for this maximization problem are (1) and (dropping the t
subscript for convenience),

6
(2)

Conditions (2) are the marginal decision rules determining~; , i

=

1, ... ,L}

=

1, ... ,J.

In this case, TF represents marginal revenue from an additional failed course by student i

in college} and Pj;TjCD + a j~C~ represents the associated (expected) marginal cost. The
first marginal cost term, Pj;TjCD , accounts for the cost associated with lost cumulative
future tuition revenue due to an increased probability that the student will drop out. The
second term represents the added cost associated with lost excess institutional capacity.
It reflects the possibility that failing more students will create bottlenecks in course

enrollments or administration that may in tum preclude the institution's ability to admit
new students at or above the historical rate.
If the role of excess capacity in determining~; is determined (or, due to data
limitations, is believed) to be minor, e.g. because of negligible values for

~, Uj orC~

(for a

critical number of colleges), then the necessary conditions for this problem collapse to
(2')

Figure 1 depicts condition (2') for student i in college}.
If this student is historically failing fewer than F* courses during the period of his
degree program, the institution would experience a gain in profit if the student were
issued more failing grades. Figure 1 therefore illuminates the main empirical question. If
F* can be empirically estimated, it can be compared with the actual number of courses the
typical student fails to determine whether the institution should promote a more rigorous
student-failure policy.
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3. The Empirics of Failing Students Optimally
In order to estimate F*, transcript data on 22,000 undergraduate and graduate students

were obtained from Utah State University (USU) Registrar's Office based on a sample
frame of all students who had declared a major in the College of Business (COB) either
prior to or during 1995-2004, regardless of whether the student ultimately graduated with
that or another COB major, and who was either still enrolled during that period or had
graduated or dropped out. 8 Students who were still enrolled, who transferred out of COB
to a different college at some point during their studies, or for whom we had missing data
were subsequently dropped from the sample. This resulted in a sample size for the
empirical analysis of approximately 13,700 students who had either graduated with a
COB degree or who had dropped out of the institution. 9 Restricting the sample in this
way has enabled the joint estimation of simple probit and negative-binomial models to
explain the relationship in the data between the probability of a student dropping out and
the number of courses failed, i.e., P'. This information, along with current tuition rates
assessed by the institution, in turn allows us to estimate F*.
Table 1 includes the definitions and summary statistics for the variables used in
the empirical analysis. The mean value for DROP indicates that 66 percent of our sample
is defined as having dropped out rather than having graduated during the period
1995-2004. This statistic reflects the liberal definition of how dropping out is defined for
this study. Any student who at some point during their COB degree program took a leave
of absence for at least two consecutive semesters is classified as having dropped out. It is
8 The Registrar was initially apprehensive about releasing data for this type of study. With
subsequent written approval from the Dean of the COB, the Registrar agreed to provide access only to
COB's transcript data. Because of data limitations for ~ , Uj and Cj , the estimation ofF· for this study is

based on (2') rather than (2).
9 As will be discussed below, our measure of "dropping out" for this study is a liberal one.
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likely that several of these students either later returned to complete their studies in a
major offered by another college or eventually plan to return to complete their degrees in
the future. Unfortunately, we are unable to distinguish with our data this type of student
from the one who drops out of the institution for good. As a result, if DROP is biasing
our estimate ofF* in any direction, it is biasing it downward. This is due to the fact that
the more students who drop out for a given number of failed courses, the steeper is the
marginal cost curve (P'T CD ) in Figure 1. For this reason, our estimate of F* should be
considered a lower-bound on the true optimal number of failed courses.
The mean value for FAIL? (0.35) indicates that approximately one-third of the
students fail at least one course during their degree program. Although the average
student only fails approximately one course during their program (mean of#FAIL =
0.88), he nevertheless retakes approximately two non-failed courses (mean of
RETAKE = 1.78). Lastly, note that the mean value of AGE for our data (30.56) is
skewed slightly to the right due to the relatively large number of older students who
typically return to the university to complete a business-related degree.
To determine F*, a two-step, or limited-information maximum-likelihood (LIML)
procedure is used to jointly estimate P' , i.e., Pr(DROP = 1), and #F AIL (Greene, 2003).10
Joint estimation is required not because of any theoretical justification for the sequential
nature of the DROP and #FAIL outcome, but rather because of the obvious potential for
endogeneity that exists between these two variables from an econometric standpoint. In
other words, although we know that students first experience the #FAIL outcome before
deciding the DROP outcome-i.e., #FAIL is predetermined with respect to DROP-as the

10 Intercooled Stata 7.0 for Windows 95/98/NT was used to produce the empirical results reported
in this section.
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econometrician we are precluded from treating #FAIL as a pre-determined variable.
From our perspective, or as an artifact of the data-gathering process, DROP and #FAIL
occur simultaneously. Because of this, and the strong likelihood that the stochastic
processes underlying DROP and #FAIL are jointly determined, joint estimation of the
two variables is justified.
In the first step we estimate Pr ( #FAIL IXl)' where each student's #FAIL is drawn

from a negative-binomial distribution to account for the count nature of the data with
mean over-dispersion. The covariate vector Xl includes a subset of the variables
included in Table 1.
Table 2 presents our results for the estimation ofPr ( #FAIL

IX

I ).

We note that, on

average, older and male students are predicted to fail more courses than their respective
counterparts, and that the more courses a student takes the greater the number of courses
he is expected to fail. To the contrary, married students and those students with higher
GP As are predicted to fail fewer courses than their counterparts. From the summary
statistics for this regression we note that the data are not distributed Poisson (the null
hypothesis of no over-dispersion (a = 0) is rejected at the 1 percent level of significance).
From the estimation of Pr ( #FAIL

IX

I)

we obtain a vector of predicted values for

""

#FAIL (henceforth denoted F), which is used as a covariate in the second-step LIML
estimation of the student's probability of dropping out. Here, we estimate
Pr(DROP = 11X2) assuming a standard normal (probit) distribution conditioned on
covariate vector X 2 with robust standard errors (White, 1980). To correct the estimator of
""

the covariance matrix for this second-step regression (due to F being used in place of
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#FAIL), we perform a series of 500 bootstrapped regressions for both steps one and two
in order to recover a non-parametric estimate of the standard errors in step two. To
perform this procedure, we take the predicted values from the step-one bootstrapped
regressions and sequentially "feed" them into the step-two regressions. The standard
deviations of the resulting distributions of the coefficients are then used as our estimates
of the step-two standard errors. 11
Table 3 reports the estimated marginal effects for Pr(DROP = lIX2)' We note
that, on average, older students are more likely to drop out than younger students. To the
contrary, men, married students, students that have been enrolled for more semesters,
students with higher GPAs, seniors, and graduate students are less likely to drop OUt. 12 In
"

,, 2

comparing the marginal effects of F and F on Pr(DROP= 1) we indeed obtain an upwardsloping marginal cost over a range of failed courses, as depicted in Figure 1. The
goodness-of-fit measures,

n1 and no, indicate that the model correctly predicts 94% and

80%, respectively, of those students who dropped out and those who did not drop out.
These measures count as a correct prediction any predicted value that is within a
magnitude of 0.5 of its corresponding DROP value.
To determine F*, the marginal effects for X2 are combined with 2004-2005 tuition
data obtained from the USU Budget Office. 13 Excluding the additional expenses
associated with room and board, books and supplies, and other personal expenses, but
including student-body fees, resident and non-resident (undergraduate) tuition costs per
11 See Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and Stine (1990) for further information regarding this
bootstrap procedure.
12 The positive marginal effect on the interaction term (FAIL?)(GPA) indicates that the negative
effect of GP A is less for those students who have failed at least one course.
13 Further information on how the marginal effects and tuition data are combined is available upon
request from the author.
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three-credit course are estimated to be $421 and $1,212, respectively. 14 The university
reports that approximately 80% of the incoming freshmen for 2004-2005 were residents.
Therefore, a weighted average of the resident and non-resident tuition costs based on this
percentage of resident students results in a per-course tuition cost (i.e., TF) of
approximately $580.
The USU Budget Office also reports annual tuition costs of approximately $3,330
and $9,700 per year (two semesters) for resident and non-resident undergraduate
students, respectively. For the purposes of this study, we therefore assume that the
(discounted weighted-average) cumulative tuition foregone to the university when seniors
decide to drop out (presumably at the beginning of their senior year) equals
approximately $4,464. 15 For ease of estimation, we lump freshmen, sophomores, and
juniors into one class (non-seniors) and assume that the decision to drop out for nonseniors is made with two years remaining to complete their degree program. Based on
the yearly tuition costs cited above, the (discounted weighted-average) cumulative tuition
foregone to the university when non-seniors decide to drop out equals approximately
$8,796. Assuming that the percentages of freshman, sophomores, juniors, and seniors at
any given time are each 25%, the average cumulative tuition foregone is $7,713.
Figure 2 presents the (constant) marginal revenue of an additional failed course
(TF) plotted at $580, the current average number of failed courses per student enrolled in

14 These figures are based on a typical student enrolling for four three-credit courses per semester.
For example, the Budget Office's reported tuition cost per semester for a resident is $1,686, implying a
$1,686 7 4 = $421.50 estimated cost per course. Similarly, for non-residents based on a reported persemester tuition cost of $4,850.
15 The annual tuition costs for resident graduate students are only slightly higher than for
undergraduate students. We therefore proceed with the assumption that undergraduate and graduate incur
equal annual tuition costs and that if a graduate student decides to drop out of the university, s/he does so at
the beginning of the second year of study. In this way, tuition foregone from graduate students is identical
to that from seniors. We assume a 3% (p = 0.03) discount rate.
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the COB plotted as a thicker vertical line at 0.88 (see Table 1), and, based on the
empirical results contained in Table 3, the expected marginal costs associated with lost
future cumulative tuition revenue from seniors (P'T cD (Senior) ) and the average student
(P'T CD ( Average Student)). The expected marginal cost for the average student is
calculated by applying the marginal-effect estimates contained in Table 3 to the
corresponding mean values (from Table 1) of the variables included in X 2 (excluding
"

,,2

F and F ). Note that optimal number of failed courses for the average student is
approximately six, implying a per-student deadweight loss (over the course of the
student's degree program) of approximately $3,200 (area A).
Similarly, the expected marginal cost for a senior is calculated by applying the
marginal-effect estimates to the mean values of the variables in X 2 , except for SENIOR
and GRAD, both of which are set equal to one. This results in an optimal number of
failed courses of approximately eight and a corresponding deadweight loss of
approximately $4,600 (area A+B). These two sets of results imply that there is scope to
fail the average senior an additional two courses during his senior year. 16

4. One Possible Ramification of Failing Students Optimally
A get-tough grading policy of the type investigated here may motivate both students and
professors to devote more effort to their studies and course preparations, respectively.
Therefore, the learning experience at a given institution could potentially move from a
low-effort/low effort to a high effortlhigh effort state as depicted in Figure 3. As shown
in the appendix, as long as the student's preferences are (positively) monotonic over some

16 For graduate students, this translates into failing the average student approximately two courses
during his two-year degree program.
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initial range of effort and the professor's preferences are similarly monotonic in teaching
effort, the possibility of such a change in the state of the world-motivated by a change in
the institution's grading policy-indeed exists.
We assume that the professor's preferences are more complex than the student's,
reflecting the fact that promotion (and thus utility) is based on a weighted average of
research and teaching performance (the latter of which is based at least partially on
student teaching evaluations). To the extent that teaching performance is based on
student evaluations, and student evaluations are in tum based on course grades, the
institutional change in grading policy will likely need to be accompanied by a change in
the weights given to student evaluations. For example, at the same time students are
learning about the new grading policy, the institution might consider informing faculty
that their teaching performance will now be based less on student evaluations and more
on peer review of their teaching portfolios. By enervating the influence of student
evaluations on the assessment of teaching performance, professors may have greater
incentive to enhance the rigor of their courses (i.e., increase their effort levels)
commensurate with the increased effort levels of (the now more fearful?) students.
Of course, the potential moral-hazard problems of overzealous faculty failing too
many students and overwhelmed (at the possibility of failing more courses) students
could unravel the high effort/high effort outcome. However, it would seem that such an
unraveling effect would be motivated more by the former moral-hazard problem, and
thus would be amenable to potentially inexpensive forms of monitoring.
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5. Conclusions
This paper has provided answers to two simple questions. First, are we in the teaching
profession failing an optimal number of students? Our results suggest that the answer is
no. There is ample scope for the typical student to fail more courses over the course of
his academic career, resulting in a recovery of between $3,200 and $4,600 in deadweight
loss per student. Second, what are the possible ramifications associated with adopting a
more stringent student-failure policy in order to achieve the optimal failure rate? We
discuss one scenario where both the students and professors increase their effort levels
and thus mutually enhance the learning experience.
Future research should focus on providing additional evidence in support or in
refutation of the results presented here. With respect to the first question-Do we fail
enough students? -applying the approach used in this paper to alternative datasets would
test the robustness of the answer provided here. With respect to the second questionWhat are the possible ramifications? -empirical evidence as to (i) the effects of professor
effort on student effort, and vice-versa, and (ii) the inhibiting effects on professors'
grading decisions of an institution's heavy reliance on student evaluations would enable a
test of the assumptions made in this paper. In the end, evidence may indeed mount in
favor of a more stringent student failure policy; a policy that not only increases the
institution's profitability, but also motivates more rigor in the learning experience itself.
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Appendix
Begin by considering the student's problem,

subject to,
(AI)
(A2)
e s = Os [ y(e) e~ + [ 1- y(e) ] e: ]

(A3)

where e: is the component of overall student effort, es, that "emanates from within" the
student and e~ is the professor's teaching effort level. Thus, in (A3) es is a weighted
average of inherent-student and professor-induced effort levels, where the weights, y, are
functions of the student's innate distribution parameter,

e, and a university leverage

factor Os> 0 (= 1 in the case of neutral leverage). Constraint (AI) is the income-budget
constraint, where Ms is student income level, Xs is a composite good with associated price
Ps, and Ls is labor supplied with associated wage rate ws. Constraint (A2) is a time
constraint, where total time available is represented by Ts and leisure time by Is. Finally,
utility US is increasing and quasi-concave in both Xs and Is, but may be parabolic in es
(increasing up to some threshold es and decreasing beyond).
After some tedious algebra and assuming sufficient second-order conditions hold,
it can be shown that although 8e; < 0 (i.e., that students will substitute professor-induced
8ep
effort for their own innate effort) their overall effort level, es, may nevertheless respond
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positively to the professor's teaching effort level. 17 In other words,

Be: = 11s Y( 8 ) + [ 1- Y( 8) ] Be
Be; ~ 0, where 11sY( 8) > 0 is the direct effect of professor

Be p

p

teaching effort on overall student effort and [1 - Y( 8) ]

Be;

Be p

< 0 is the indirect effect.

Therefore, as long as the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect over some initial
range of e~ , the student's effort reaction function will be positively sloped over that range.
One possible shape of the student's effort reaction function is depicted in Figure A 1
below (as curve es).

Figure At. Possible Student and Professor Effort Reaction Functions

17

I=~b

To show this result, use the fact that if

Ib dl = ad - be < °,then for any t > 0,

dl = be - ad > 0, which can be generalized to a square matrix of any dimension.
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Unfortunately, the solution to the professor's problem is not nearly as clean. It
can be written as,
~ax
{e er xl}
t

p'

p'

US

p' p

(e~,e~,xp,lp;es

)

subject to,
~p

= Ppxp = W p1 + Pr(Eval)Wp2

(A4)
(AS)

SE = S ( f ( e s )' g ( f ( e s )' e~ ) )

(A6)

Tp =1p +e pt +e pr

(A7)

wheree~, es, x p, Ip, ~p, PP' and Tp are defined analogously to the student's problem,
withe~representing

the professor's research effort level. In (A4), Wpl is a base salary

level, W p2 , is an increment to W p1 based on the outcome of an institutional evaluation of
the professor's overall performance, Eval represents the outcome of the evaluation, and
Pr(Eval) is the expected outcome of the evaluation, where Pr is a subjective probability
density function defined over Eval. In (AS), Eval is defined as a weighted average of
teaching and research effort, as well as the average score from student evaluations, SE ,
where A~ and A~ are the corresponding weighting factors. In (A6), SE is defined as a
function of the distribution of student effort, f( es), and the distribution of students' grades,
g, which is in turn based on the students' and professor's (teaching) effort levels. S is
assumed strictly increasing in g, but potentially parabolic in f( es), while g is assumed
strictly increasing and concave in fees) ande~. Finally, (A7) is the professor's time
constraint.
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Bet
Given the complexity of the professor's problem, the sign of _ P is indeterminate.
Be s
Figure Al therefore depicts one of any number of possible professor effort reaction
functions, denoted e~. As depicted, the low effort/low effort state of the world (point A)
is unstable - indicating a divergent effort path in either direction. However, the high
effort/high effort state at point B is steady without oscillation from either direction. In
this situation, any tweek away from point A in the direction of point B will move the
effort equilibrium steadily to B.
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Variable

Description

ENTER

Year student first enrolled at USU (21 = 2004, ..... ,1 = 1983).

DROP

1 = dropped out, 0 = graduated

AGE

Age (in years) when first enrolled at USU.

GENDER

1 = male, 0 = female

MARITAL

1 = married, 0 = single

ETHNIC

1 = international, 2 = Asian, 3 = white, not of Hispanic origin, 4
= other, 5 = black, not of Hispanic origin, 6 = other Hispanic

#SEMS

Total number of semesters enrolled during degree program.

#COURSES

Total number of different courses taken during degree program.

STAND
FAIL?

1 = undergraduate student, 2 = graduate student, 3 = second
bachelors degree
Did student fail at least one course during degree program?
1 = yes, 0 = no

#FAIL

Total number of courses failed during degree program.

GPA

Cumulative GPA at end of degree program (if FAIL? = 0)
Cumulative GP A up to first failed course (if FAIL? = 1)
(4.0 is maximum)

RETAKE

Number of courses retaken that were not failed.

SENIOR
GRAD

Class standing when either dropped out or graduated.
1 = Senior, 0 = otherwise
Class standing when either dropped out or graduated.
1 = graduate level or second bachelors, 0 = otherwise

Mean
(SD)
13.51
(2.49)
0.66
(0.47)
30.56
(22.07)
0.59
(0.49)
0.35
(0.48)
2.86
(0.67)
9.47
(6.10)
31.00
(19.60)
1.13
(0.37)
0.35
(0.48)
0.88
(1.79)
3.04
(0.57)
1.78
(3.12)
0.5
(0.5)
0.14
(0.35)
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Table 2. Regression Results for Pr ( #FAIL
Explanatory Variable
CONSTANT
STAND
AGE
GENDER
MARITAL
ETHNIC
#COURSES

FAIL?
GPA

a
t(a)
Log likelihood
2
X (LR)
Pseudo R2
Number of Observations

I) .

Coefficient Estimate
(Standard Error)
-18.82
(138.63)
-0.25"'''''''
(0.05)
0.002 ......
(0.0008)
0.08 ......
(0.03)
-0.06"
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.01···
(0.001)
19.62
(138.63)
-0.04·
(0.02)
0.21"·
(0.01)
632.80···
-7549.26
13 ,045 ......
0.46
11,862

.....Slgmficant at the 1% level. ..Slgmficant
.
at the 5% level.
"Significant at the 10% level.

IX
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Table 3. Regression Results forPr(DROP = 1IX2)'
Explanatory Variable
STAND
ENTER
AGE
GENDER
MARITAL
ETHNIC
#SEMS
GPA
(FAIL?) (GPA)
SENIOR
GRAD
-'"

F
-"'2

F

Lo g likelihood
i(LR)
Pseudo R2
Number of Observations
Q _ Predicted DROP = 1
1Observed DROP = 1
Q _ Predicted DROP = 0
0Observed DROP = 0

Marginal Effects
(Standard Error)
-0.1 5***
(0.015)
-0.05***
(0.002)
0.02***
(0.0007)
-0.03***
(0.007)
-0.06***
(0.008)
-0.03"**
(0.005)
-0.008 ......
(0.001)
-0.13 ......
(0.01)
0.10 ......
(0.013)
-0.30 ......
(0.01)
-0.69--'--'--'
(0.03)
-0.25*
(0.14)
0.05-*"'*(0.01)
-3165.86
8186.67***
0.56
11,860
0.94
0.80

·"Significant at the 1% level. ·Significant at the 10% level.
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Figure 1. The Optimal Number of Failed Courses (Theory).
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Figure 2. The Optimal Number of Failed Courses (Empirically).
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Figure 3. The Student/Professor Effort Game.
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